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Abstract—Following the Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA)
and the Cloud paradigms, an increasing number of organizations
implement their business processes and applications via runtime
composition of services made available on the cloud by single
suppliers. This scenario however introduces new security risks
and threats, as the service providers may not provide the level
of assurance required by their customers. There is therefore the
need of a new certification scheme for services that provides
trusted evidence that a remote service has some security proper-
ties, and a matching infrastructure to compare service certificates
with users’ certification preferences. In this paper, we provide a
first solution to the definition of a test-based certification process
for SOA.
I. INTRODUCTION
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) and Cloud compu-
tation paradigms provide the basis to integrate applications
across a global ICT infrastructure, allowing remote users to
access information and services supplied by service providers.
Organizations increasingly implement their business processes
via run-time (as opposed to design-time) selection and com-
position of such services [5], that communicate over the ICT
infrastructure by using standard Web protocols and technol-
ogy [3].
Such a flexible implementation of a business process in an
open service ecosystem exposes applications to a number of
new security risks and threats. This scenario increases users’
concerns about the security of remote services, e.g. against
penetration or Denial-of-Service attacks, as well as about the
protection of the data disclosed to them, e.g. as input param-
eters. Pushing the SOA vision on an open ICT infrastructure
requires careful re-thinking of current development, testing,
and verification methodologies, and introduces the need of
new assurance techniques that will increase the users’ trust
that services will satisfy their functional and non-functional
requirements.
Certification can play a role to establish a trust model
suitable for service ecosystems; but existing certification tech-
niques and protocols (e.g., Common Criteria [4]) have been de-
fined for traditional software components rather than services.
Indeed existing certification schemes try and provide engineers
in charge of software procurement with trusted evidence, based
on testing and formal verification signed by a trusted third
party, that a software product has some features, conforms to
specified requirements, and behaves as expected [1]. In this
position paper, we put forward the idea that the definition
of a certification scheme that can be used at run-time to
make trusted assurance information available in a service
ecosystem [2]. Certification of services can in fact represent
an important plus for open SOAs, allowing service users to
evaluate different services and select the appropriate ones for
service composition. In the remainder of the paper, we present
the challenges and a first solution to the problem of test-based
certification of services, including how test-based certificates
can be automatically matched with users’ preferences on the
certification process.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS OF TEST-BASED CERTIFICATION FOR
SOA
According to Damiani et al. [1], “test-based certificates are
evidence-based proofs that a test carried out on the software
has given a certain result, which in turn shows (perhaps with
a certain level of uncertainty) that a given property holds for
that software. In particular, test-based certification of security-
related properties is a complex process, identifying a set of
high-level security properties and linking them to a suitable
set of white- and black-box software tests”. Starting from the
above definition, a certification process for services should first
define a machine-readable certificate format linking a set of
properties with the evidence supporting them. To this aim, a
service-oriented certification scheme defines a hierarchy HP
of security properties and the classes of tests that can be used
to prove that some test has been carried out on a service and
a given property holds.
Hierarchy HP of security properties. Formally, a hierarchy
HP of security properties is a pair (P ,P ), where P is
the set of all security properties, and P is a partial order
relationship over P . Given two properties pi and pj in P ,
we say that piP pj if pi is an abstraction of pj . For in-
stance, (return parameter) integrity is an abstraction of prop-
erties crypt&sign, sign&crypt (i.e., integrityP crypt&sign,
integrityP sign&crypt). This means that each request for a
service that guarantees a property of integrity of its return pa-
rameter will also be satisfied by a service showing a certificate
for a property that is dominated by integrity. Figure 1(a) shows
an example of hierarchy of security properties. As shown
in the figure, each security property (black squares) is also
(a)
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Fig. 1. An example of a hierarchy of security properties (a) and classes of
tests (b)
characterized by a set A of class attributes (dashed squares)
that refer to a set of threats the service proves to counteract
or to specific characteristics of the security function that is
certified. Each attribute a∈A is characterized by a total order
relationship ≥. For instance, a service may expose a certificate
proving that it supports a (return parameter) confidentiality
property with a 3DES algorithm and a key of 112bits. Here,
we use class attributes to distinguish between properties that
are operationally different although share the same name.
Class attributes also simplify the matching process between
the certificate held by a service and the users’ preferences. A
user may in fact require a service proving confidentiality with
3DES algorithm and a key of at least 168bits.
Classes of tests. Each security property in P can be associated
with zero or more test units used to certify it. Test units are
organized in hierarchies. Formally, a hierarchy HT of test
units is a pair (T ,T ), where T is the set of all test units,
and T is a partial order relationship over T . Given two test
units ti and tj in T , tiT tj if ti is an abstraction of tj . Test
units are then organized in classes of tests having a set TA of
test attributes. Each test attribute ta∈TA is characterized by
a total order relationship ≥. Figure 1(b) shows an example
of classes of tests together with hierarchies of test units. For
instance, in Figure 1(b), the class Penetration(int n), where
n is a test attribute representing the cardinality of the test
set, contains the test units Non-Valid XML Tree, Well-Formed
XML Tree, and Malformed XML Tree. For instance, Non-Valid
XML TreeT Malformed XML Tree, while Malformed XML
Tree6T Well-Formed XML Tree.
In our vision, each test-based certificate is composed by two
main sections: i) a (set of) property and related class attributes
(that we will call security property in the following); ii) a (set
of) evidence signed by a third party proving that the service
supports that property. An evidence is composed by a set of
test units providing detailed specification of testing practices
(environment, run-time context) and outcome, together with
the set of test attributes associated with the classes the test
units belong to.
III. DOUBLE-MATCHING STRATEGY
The traditional SOA paradigm consists of an infrastructure
where services are searched and composed at run-time based
on the users’ preferences.Our service certification scheme
should then be integrated within the existing SOA infras-
tructure and complement it by providing a mechanism where
users define their preferences in terms of certified properties,
evidence, and tests, and automatically match them against
the certificates awarded to the services. Run-time certificate
matching will then permit the users to evaluate if the assurance
level provided by the service certificate is compatible with her
own preferences.
In our scenario, we need a double-matching strategy
which involves a check both on security properties (property-
match) and on evidences (evidence-match) in the certifi-
cate. More in detail, let S be a service with a certifi-
cate C
((P1,E1). . .(Pn,En)
)
, where Pi is a security property
(pi,Ai) with pi a property in P and Ai = {ai,1, . . . , ai,l}
a set of class attributes, and Ei is an evidence (ti,TAi) with
ti a test unit in T and TAi = {tai,1, . . . , tai,k} a set of test
attributes. Also, let R
((P ′
1
,E′
1
). . .(P ′m,E′m)
)
be the preferences
of the user in the form of a service request, where P ′j is a
security property (p′j ,A′j) with p′j the requested property in
P and A′j = {a′j,1, . . . , a′j,s} a set of class attributes, and
E′j is an evidence (tj ′,TA′j) with tj ′ a test unit in T and
TA′j = {ta′j,1, . . . , ta′j,z} a set of test attributes. In the follow-
ing, for the sake of simplicity, we will consider certificates
and requests of the form C(P ,E) and R(P ′,E′), respectively,
where P=(p,A), E=(t,TA), P ′=(p′,A′), and E′=(t′,TA′). The
matching process between a certificate C and a request R,
denoted as C×R, is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Matching process): Let C(P ,E) be a cer-
tificate awarded to a service and R(P ′,E′) be a request by
a user. The matching process C×R is a process that first
compares P and P ′ (property-match). If and only if this
comparison succeed, the matching process compares E and
E′ (evidence-match). The matching process is successful if
and only if both property-match and evidence-match succeed.
The matching process C×R can return two results as
follows:
1) match, if and only if:
• p′P p, and ∀a′ ∈ A′, ∃a ∈ A s.t a ≥ a′ (property-
match), and
• t
′T t , and ∀ta′ ∈ TA′, ∃ta ∈TA s.t ta ≥ ta′
(evidence-match).
2) no match, otherwise.
In the following we discuss the match/no match scenarios
by means of two examples on the single case study shown
Fig. 2. An example of test-based certificate matching
in Figure 2. Figure 2 also shows two instance values for the
class attribute type: Malformed XML Tree and Compliance
with the Application Schema in the WSDL.
Example 1 (Match). The left part of Figure 2 presents an
example of a successful matching between a service cer-
tificate (blue line) and the user’s preferences in the form
of a service request (red dashed line). In particular, let us
consider an (enhanced) UDDI registry that contains a set
of services together with their certificates.1 Also, let us
consider a service S in the registry that has a certificate
C proving a security property (p,A)=(Robustness.WS Input
Malformation,{Type=Malformed XML Tree}) with evidence
(t,TA)=(Penetration test using Malformed XML Tree,{n=k}).
Suppose now that a user submits a request R to the registry
searching for a service that has a certificate proving a generic
security property (p′,A′)=(Robustness.WS Input Malforma-
tion,{}) with evidence (t′,TA′)=(Penetration test using Non-
Valid XML Tree,{n=m}), with k > m. The registry searches
among its set of services and selects all services that expose a
certificate C with a security property (pi,Ai) that matches with
the security property (p′,A′) in R (property-match). Service S
is considered for matching since p′P p based on the hierarchy
in Figure 1(a)2 and the set of class attributes is empty in R
meaning that any combination of attributes in the certificate is
acceptable. Among the selected services, the registry compares
the evidence in the certificate with the evidence in the request
(evidence-match). Considering service S, it is clear that the
evidences match because t ′T t and k > m. As a result,
C×R=match.
1Extensions to UDDI registry metadata including test outcomes have been
proposed by several research groups [6].
2In the example, p and p′ are the same security property. In general, p′
may be an abstraction of p.
Example 2 (No-Match). The right part of Figure 2 presents
an example of failed matching between service certifi-
cate (blue line) and user’s preferences (red dashed line).
Again, let us consider a UDDI registry that contains a
set of services together with their certificates. Also, let
us consider a service S that has a certificate C prov-
ing a security property (p,A)=(Robustness.WS Input Mal-
formation,{Type=Compliance with Application Schema in
the WSDL}) with evidence (t,TA)=(Penetration test using
Well-Formed XML Tree,{n=k}). Suppose now, that a user
is submitting a request R to the registry searching for
a service that has a certificate proving a generic security
property (p′,A′)=(Robustness.WS Input Malformation,{}) with
evidence (t′,TA′)=(Penetration test using Malformed XML
Tree,{n=m}), with k > m. As in Example 1, service S is
considered for matching since p′P p based on the hierarchy
in Figure 1(a) and the set of class attributes is empty in
R (property-match). However, in this example, there is no
evidence-match because, although k > m, t ′ 6T t . As a result,
C×R=no-match.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented some preliminary ideas on some basic mech-
anisms for integrating test-based certification in a SOA sce-
nario. Our future work will focus on the definition of a
machine-readable certificate format, the definition of complete
hierarchy of security properties and classes of tests, the
matching and comparison between different classes of tests
and between non-quantitative or unordered test units (e.g.,
penetration tests involving different inputs), and the problem
of certifying dynamically composed services, starting from the
composition of the certificates of their basic components.
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